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ABSTRACT 
As the transformative potential of AI has become increasingly 
salient as a matter of public and political interest, there has 
been growing discussion about the need to ensure that AI 
broadly benefits humanity. This in turn has spurred debate on 
the social responsibilities of large technology companies to 
serve the interests of society at large. In response, ethical 
principles and codes of conduct have been proposed to meet the 
escalating demand for this responsibility to be taken seriously. 
As yet, however, few institutional innovations have been 
suggested to translate this responsibility into legal 
commitments which apply to companies positioned to reap 
large financial gains from the development and use of AI. This 
paper offers one potentially attractive tool for addressing such 
issues: the Windfall Clause, which is an ex ante commitment by 
AI firms to donate a significant amount of any eventual 
extremely large profits. By this we mean an early commitment 
that profits that a firm could not earn without achieving 
fundamental, economically transformative breakthroughs in AI 
capabilities will be donated to benefit humanity broadly, with 
particular attention towards mitigating any downsides from 
deployment of windfall-generating AI. 
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1 Introduction 
As the transformative potential of AI has become increasingly 
salient as a matter of public and political interest, there has 
been growing discussion about the need to ensure that AI 
broadly benefits humanity.1 This in turn has spurred debate on 
 
1 This has center ed most visibly on the issue of AI applications beginning to  
replace human labor in many sectors [2, 10, 13, 15, 25, 32, 35, 39]. 
the social responsibilities of large technology companies to 
serve the interests of society at large. In response, ethical 
principles and codes of conduct have been proposed to meet the 
escalating demand for this responsibility to be taken seriously. 
As yet, however, few institutional innovations have been 
suggested to translate this responsibility into legal 
commitments which apply to companies positioned to reap 
large financial gains from the development and use of AI.  
This paper offers one potentially attractive tool for 
addressing such issues: the Windfall Clause. The Windfall 
Clause is an ex ante commitment by AI firms to donate a 
significant amount of any eventual extremely large profits. By 
“extremely large profits,” or “windfall,” we mean profits that a 
firm could not earn without achieving fundamental, 
economically transformative breakthroughs in AI capabilities. 
By “ex ante,” we mean that we seek to have the Clause in effect 
before any individual AI firm has a serious prospect of earning 
such extremely large profits. “Donate” means, roughly, that the 
donated portion of the windfall will be used to benefit humanity 
broadly, with particular attention towards mitigating any 
downsides from deployment of windfall-generating AI.  
We introduce the Windfall Clause not as a bullet-proof 
solution for the ethical problems associated with windfall-
generating AI, but in order to stimulate thought and debate 
about potential solutions. Much more thought, study, and 
deliberation will be needed in order to identify the best policy 
tools.  
In this paper we will first outline the motivations for 
considering a mechanism such as the Windfall Clause. Then, we 
describe the contents of the Windfall Clause and compare it to 
analogous corporate philanthropy efforts. We conclude by 
briefly summarizing both our analysis of the legal permissibility 
of such a mechanism and reflections on potential concerns with 
the Windfall Clause. 
 2 Motivations 
The Windfall Clause could advance a number of public policy 
objectives related to the development of AI. Here, we outline the 
four most prominent policy motivations. 
2.1 Addressing Employment Effects 
The net effects of AI on aggregate wealth will probably be highly 
positive due to increased productivity [1]. However, many have 
argued that AI could lead to a substantial lowering of wages 
[10], job displacement, and even large-scale elimination of 
employment opportunities as the structure of the economy 
changes productivity [8]. 
One general consideration that supports these concerns is 
the strong consensus among AI researchers that most, if not all, 
human work can in theory be automated [1, 26, 46]. Most AI 
researchers also believe that at some point in the future, 
progress in AI will make near-complete automation feasible, 
particularly given that the upper bound of AI capabilities likely 
exceeds human capabilities [7, 29].2 Of course, people have 
unsuccessfully predicted that automation will end human 
employment many times in the past.3 We do not mean to imply 
that such joblessness is inevitable or even probable; only that it 
is possible given certain assumptions about the future of AI.  
If these predictions are realized, then the Windfall Clause 
could provide an important safety net for those who lose their 
jobs to automation. For example, the distributed funds could 
pay for job retraining or subsidize alternative, prosocial 
activities for which no market yet exists (such as engaging in 
community service). 
2.2 Mitigating Income Inequality 
Similarly, many worry that automation will increase wealth 
inequality. Automation increases returns to capital, and capital 
ownership is highly concentrated [8, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50]. Thus, in 
the absence of intervention, automation deployed by business 
could increase the share of income going to shareholders over 
workers [30, 43, 44]. 
 The Windfall Clause contributes to addressing this by 
ensuring that extremely large benefits from AI will accrue not 
just to shareholders and executives of corporate AI labs, but to 
everyone. In other words, an enforceable Windfall Clause is a 
credible ex ante commitment to prevent extreme income 
inequality from AI. 
2.3 Stabilizing Societal Relationships 
Advanced AI could radically and rapidly reshape global 
economics [8]. To the extent that AI disrupts prevailing social 
and economic conditions, the distribution of windfall profits 
 
2 “Taking th e mean over eac h individual, th e aggregate forec ast gav e a 5 0%  
chanc e of [the arrival of machines that c an accomplish, without aid, every task  
better and more ch eaply th an humans ] occurring within 4 5 years and a 10% 
chance of it occurring within 9 years” [29]. 
3  See Robots, IGM Forum (F ebruary 25th, 20 14), perma.cc /N4U D-
HE7N?type=image. 
would afford all beneficiaries a financial buffer. For example, if 
someone loses her job due to rapid advances in automation,4 
the Windfall Clause could provide a sort of “unemployability 
insurance” that enables her to weather the transition to a new 
economy. 
This individual stability is desirable in itself, but it could also 
translate to macro-scale stability. Automatic widespread 
distribution of gains from advanced AI would decrease the risk 
of catalyzing popular political pressure for drastic responses to 
the new economic conditions5 [32]. Individuals who, thanks to 
windfall dividends, maintain or even see increases in their 
standard of living, may be less likely to initiate a destabilizing 
response [3, 4, 5, 37, 43, 48] and thus threaten the path towards 
a more prosperous society [6, 19, 34, 36]. 
2.4 Strengthening Prosocial Norms 
A number of influential developers, officials, and industry 
groups have declared their intent to develop AI ethically [9, 17, 
18, 27, 33]. Agreeing to be bound by a Windfall Clause provides 
an immediate and ambitious target for groups interested in 
promoting broadly beneficial AI and would send a meaningful 
signal of the signatory’s broader support for this goal. This, in 
turn, would strengthen the emerging international norm of 
developing AI only for good, making further beneficial uses of AI 
more likely. 
3 Contents of the Windfall Clause 
3.1 Signatory Commitments 
Signatories’ obligations under the Windfall Clause will 
ultimately need to be defined according to some mathematical 
function, even if it is a simple function. In preliminary work we 
have identified the desiderata shown in table 1 for this 
“Windfall Function.” 
Accordingly, we are preliminarily proposing a Windfall 
Function that would operate similar to an income tax: a higher 
percentage of marginal revenue would be pledged as profits 
increased.  
Crucially, though, the commitment would scale not with 
absolute profit levels, but with profit levels relative to the global 
economy (“elasticity”). Thus, commitments would scale as an 
individual signatory’s profits constituted a greater portion of 
gross world product (GWP), as shown in table 2. 
3.2 Distribution Design 
After the Windfall Clause has been triggered and contributions 
have been made in accordance with the Windfall Function, the 
funds would then need to be distributed. Distributors of 
Windfall Clause funds would engage in activities that address 
 
4 This concern already looms large among many workers globally [50]. 
5 Most individuals b elieve that governments ar e responsib le for ensuring 
workers’ success in the face of job automation [50]. 
 the public and corporate interests identified above. Ideally, 
distributors would balance several considerations, including: 
1. Effectiveness at promoting the common good and/or 
addressing the specific downsides of advanced AI; 
2. Accountability, so that decision-making is not made on 
improper bases; 
3. Legitimacy, so that people feel the money is being spent 
fairly and for the common good; and 
4. Developers’ interests, so that AI developers feel 
comfortable signing on to the Clause. 
Investigating appropriate and desirable options for 
distributing the Windfall Clause funds is an important area of 
work which is still in its early stages, and thus could be a fruitful 
area of future research. 
 
Table 1: Desiderata for “Windfall Function” 
Table 2: Commitment scaling based on signatory’s profits as portion of gross world product 
Bracket (Profits as Portion of GWP) Marginal Clause Obligation (Portion of Marginal Profits) 
0%–0.1% 0% 
0.1%–1% 1% 
1%–10% 20% 
10%–100% 50% 
4 Comparison to Present Philanthropy 
As a simplified illustration of how much the Clause might cost a 
firm in expectation, consider an example wherein a signatory 
earns $5 trillion (in 2010 dollars) profit from AI in 2060,6 when 
the GWP is $268 trillion (again in 2010 dollars). Under the 
proposed Windfall Function above, such a corporation would be 
obligated to give $488.12 billion (again in 2010 dollars). 
Suppose, optimistically, that a firm in 2019 had a 1% chance 
of earning such profits by 2060 (and otherwise a 99% chance of 
earning profits that would not trigger the Windfall Clause). 
Further suppose, for extreme simplicity, that if the firm achieves 
windfall profits, under the Clause it will continue to owe 
$488.12 billion per year forever.7 
 
6 This year w as chosen bas ed on AI res earc hers ’ pro jections of wh en AI wou ld  
be able to outperform humans at all economically relevant tasks [29]. 
7 In reality, of course,  this wou ld d epend on how G WP rises r elative to  the firm ’s 
profits. The projec tions and calcu lations for such a scenario are far too  
specu lative and b eyond th e authors’  capacity to  estimate h ere.  Th us, w e us e the 
 
If we discount annually at 10% (the approximate cost of 
capital for internet software firms) [14, 31], the present cost of 
such a commitment, if realized, is equal to $64.934 billion (in 
2010 dollars). If we further discount that amount by 99% (to 
account for the probability of not achieving windfall profits and 
therefore bearing no costs under the Clause), we arrive at an 
expected present cost of $649.34 million (in 2010 dollars). 
To compare this to past corporate philanthropy, 2015 ’s 
largest donor was Gilead Sciences with $446.7 million [41]. In 
2010 dollars, this would be $414.17 million.8 Note that this 
historical comparison only includes outright cash donations, not 
the (opportunity) cost of other forms of CSR [41]. Thus, even 
under very optimistic assumptions about a signatory’s 
prospects for achieving and maintaining windfall-generating AI, 
 
very simple assumption of perpetu al and constant  obligations to avoid this 
specu lation. We hope that future work will allow for better estimates of the 
expected costs of the Windfall Clause. 
8 Calculated using the CPI Inf lation Calcu lator, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
perma.cc/4QRE-JAQA (archived Aug. 3, 2019). 
Desideratum Description Justification 
Transparency Determining whether a signatory has met their 
obligations is easy 
Avoids costly disputes and public relations benefits 
Elasticity The amount owed under the Clause depends on 
the size of the global economy when triggered 
Maintains focus on relative windfall, not nominal 
profits 
Adequacy The amount owed under the Clause is 
proportionate to the challenges it seeks to 
address 
Respects the seriousness of the policy motivations 
for the Clause 
Nominal Near-Windfall 
Commitment 
Signatories owe small-but-nonzero amounts as 
they approach windfall profit levels 
Demonstrates signatories’ intent to be bound; tests 
effectiveness of Clause 
Incentive Alignment Signatories should always have an incentive to 
earn more profits 
Diminishes incentives for evading Clause 
obligations 
Competitiveness Signatories remain competitive with non-
signatory developers 
Prevents perverse effect of causing non-signatories 
to out-compete signatories 
 the expected present costs to a signatory are only 60% greater 
than leading corporate philanthropy efforts today. 
5 Legal Permissibility 
In American corporate law, fiduciary duties require for-profit 
corporate management to act in the best interests of the 
corporation. “Corporate expenditures today are judged under 
the business judgment rule, a standard that accords substantial 
deference to management’s judgment. The fact that a perceived 
benefit is intangible, noneconomic, or uncertain will not 
invalidate a corporate expenditure” [24]. Thus, “courts [have] 
upheld discretionary corporate giving on the theory that 
donating to charity benefits the corporation,” [24]9 as recounted 
above. Although the Clause is perhaps unique—indeed, 
somewhat unprecedented—among corporate donations in that 
it will be very demanding if triggered, for any given firm the 
expected cost of the commitment should be quite low due to the 
extremely low probability of obtaining windfall profits. Since 
the permissibility of corporate actions are evaluated ex ante 
instead of ex post10 [20], this should mean that the Clause is 
permissible as a matter of corporate law.  
A useful analogy can be drawn between the Windfall Clause 
and stock option compensation, which is incontrovertibly 
permissible. Like the Windfall Clause, stock option payments 
have a permissibly low present expected value but can have a 
much higher value once exercised.11 For example, in 2005, 
Facebook issued a large block of stock options to its CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg [21]. Zuckerberg exercised these options in 2012 
[22] and 2013 [23] for a net pre-tax value of over $5.3 billion.12 
If evaluated ex post (i.e., after Zuckerberg exercised the options), 
the 2005 stock options were wildly excessive CEO 
compensation for a company that earlier that year was 
evaluated at only $100 million [16]. However, when one 
evaluates the stock options ex ante—as is proper—then they 
were appropriate. Analogously, the Windfall Clause might 
appear excessive as a corporate donation if evaluated ex post, 
but it is clearly reasonable if evaluated ex ante. 
 
 
9 Citing Kah n v. Sullivan, 59 4 A.2d 48, 61  (D el.  1991 ); Th eodor a Ho lding Corp. v.  
Henderson, 257 A.2d  398,  405  (Del. Ch. 196 9); A.P.  Smi th Mfg.  Co. v.  Barlow,  98  
A.2d 581, 590 (N.J. 1953). 
10 See, e.g., In re Tyson Foods, Inc., 919 A.2d 563, 586 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
11 Indeed, since ther e is no upper bou nd on stock  price, stock options could  hav e 
arbitrarily high value ex post. 
12 All options had  an  exercise price of $0.06, and Z uckerb erg acquired 60 million  
shares in each tr ansaction [22, 23]. Facebook’s stock was valu ed at  
$34.03/sh are for the 2012  trans action. See FB Historical Prices, Yahoo! Finance,  
perma.cc /GE8A-CBKZ (archived Feb. 7, 2019 ). Thu s, in the 2012 transaction,  
Zuckerber g p aid $3.6 million for $2.0418  billion in stock  for a net pr e-tax gain of  
$2.0382 billion. F acebook’s  stock was  valued at $55.1 2/sh are for th e 2013  
transac tion. See FB Historical Pric es, Yahoo! Finance, perma.cc /JJJ5-VM46  
(archived F eb. 7, 2019). Thus, in the 201 3 trans action, Zuckerb erg paid $3.6 
million for $3.3072 billion in stock for a net pre-tax gain of $3.3036 billion. 
6 Two Major Objections 
We have spent a lot of time considering potential concerns and 
flaws of the Windfall Clause. In this section, we reflect on two 
common concerns.  
6.1 “Windfall profits should just be taxed.” 
Some might object to—or at least be uneasy with—extra-
governmental disposition of windfall profits, perhaps arguing 
instead that the windfall should simply be taxed (if earned by a 
private individual or organization) and spent by democratically 
accountable governments [11, 12, 28, 38, 40, 42, 45].  
Taxation might be overall preferable to a private Windfall 
Clause. The Windfall Clause leaves open the possibility of 
taxation, and could be drafted so as to relieve firms of their 
responsibilities if combined Clause and tax burdens exceeded 
some reasonable threshold. 
An advantage of the Windfall Clause, however, is that it is 
more presently actionable than dramatic tax reform since it 
depends only on convincing individual firms, not political 
majorities. Further, we hope that promotion of the Windfall 
Clause or related solutions to the economic problems and 
opportunities posed by automation will serve as a catalyst for 
broader exploration of the solution space, including taxation. 
However, we also note that the economic effects of 
automation are likely to transcend political boundaries. Thus, a 
primary advantage of the Clause over most current forms of 
taxation is that the Clause could distribute benefits 
internationally. This could diminish adversarial international 
competition for the benefits of AI and also lead to more effective 
uses of the funds given global inequality.13  
6.2 ”Firms will find a way to circumvent their commitments 
under the Clause.” 
We do worry that the Clause could be circumvented either by 
either legal (e.g., contractual loopholes or strategic accounting 
practices) or extralegal (e.g., intentionally evading Clause 
obligations) means. 
Some of this problem is mitigable—if not completely 
solvable—by careful contractual and mechanism design. 
Crafting a Clause with meaningful monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms is a significant task and would be important to the 
success of the Clause. 
Most remaining problems would arise from a firm 
intentionally flouting its legal commitments. Such problems 
warrant significant attention from the AI policy community as 
well, but the Clause probably cannot solve them alone. 
7 Conclusion 
Artificial Intelligence may be poised to fundamentally change 
the nature of the global economy. One possible future is a 
 
13 See “Your Dollar Goes Furth er Overseas,” GiveWell, perma.cc /GNP3-4R HJ  
(archived Apr. 15, 2019). 
 scenario in which advanced AI services result in unprecedented 
“windfall” profits that accrue to a very small number of actors. 
This scenario is highly undesirable, not only because humanity 
at large will have borne the risk of innovations along the way, 
but also because the creation of such wealth might be 
accompanied by mass unemployment and other occurrences 
that increase human suffering.  
The Windfall Clause aims to address the downsides of such a 
scenario, if the development of truly windfall-generating AI 
were to occur. With further refinement, the Windfall Clause 
could be a significant, credible, and tractable way for AI firms to 
direct their inventions towards the enrichment of humanity 
generally, and still reap substantial rewards for doing so.  
We hope to contribute an ambitious and novel policy 
proposal to an already rich discussion on this subject. More 
important than this policy itself, though, we look forward to 
continuously contributing to broader conversations on the 
economic promises and challenges of AI, and how to ensure AI 
benefits humanity as a whole. 
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